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ABSTRACT 
This article puts forward a number of arguments why trade openness might 
promote multilateral environmental cooperation. Most of these arguments are 
grounded in the substantive self-interest of the trading country. It tests the 
proposition using a range of proxy variables for general trade openness as well as 
specific export interests. The article examines whether countries open to trade are 
more likely to have signed three recent multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) and are more likely to have ratified early on another three agreements 
with quasi-universal membership. After controlling for income, political freedom 
and population size, the empirical estimations find some weak evidence in favour 
of a possible synergy between trade openness and multilateral environmental 
cooperation. World Trade Organization membership as well as general export 
openness go hand in hand with greater willingness to participate in multilateral 
environmental cooperation in some cases. However, whether specific trade 
interests promote or hinder multilateral environmental cooperation depends on 
whether the relevant agreement is likely to threaten or accommodate the interests 
of exporting countries. 
 
Keywords: trade openness, environmental commitment, multilateral 
environmental agreement, export interests, ratification speed. 
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1. WHY TRADE OPENNESS MIGHT PROMOTE MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 
This article examines whether trade openness promotes multilateral environmental 
cooperation. The reader might wonder what one has to do with the other, but the 
liberal, functionalist and neo-functionalist schools of international relations (IR) 
have long since argued that openness to trade might foster cooperation and 
disperse confrontation in other policy areas. Most prominently, the suggestion that 
trading states might be less prone to go to war against each other dates back to at 
least Eméric Crucé (1623 [1909]). Many of the classical liberal economists in the 
wake of Adam Smith (1776 [1979]) shared the same belief, most notably John 
Stuart Mill who saw ‘the great extent and rapid increase of international trade’ as 
the ‘principal guarantee of the peace of the world’ (Mill, 1852 [1965], p. 594). 
The case for a “liberal peace”,2 as comprehensively put forward in Rosecrance 
(1986), rests on both substantive self-interest as well as more idealistic grounds. 
As concerns the substantive self-interest, the major argument is that states with 
substantial mutual trading links have more to lose in terms of welfare if these links 
become interrupted by violent conflict. Also, the exploitation of trading 
opportunities can serve as a substitute and alternative for acquiring natural 
resources and markets by force. The more idealistic grounds suggest that 
international trade might foster a spirit of community and cooperation. Against 
this, proponents of the realistic school of IR have long since argued that trade is 
irrelevant as traditional political and military considerations dominate the decision 
to enter into violent conflict. The empirical evidence is somewhat indeterminate, 
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with the majority of studies supporting the idea of a liberal peace (see, for 
example, Oneal et al., 1996; Hegre, 2000; for conflicting evidence see, for 
example, Barbieri, 1996; Beck, Katz and Trucker, 1998). 
A combination of self-interest and idealistic grounds could also suggest a case 
for trade openness promoting multilateral environmental cooperation. To start 
with, countries open to trade have a reputation to defend. In a world where 
imports of foreign goods are still regarded as mainly benefiting the exporter, 
exporting countries are always at the risk of being blamed for exploiting their 
good economic fortunes. To participate, and possibly to lead, in multilateral 
cooperation, environmental or not, can provide a mechanism to disperse these 
concerns to some extent. This incentive will be the stronger the more a country is 
a net exporter of goods and services. It will also be particularly strong in the 
environmental field if the country is engaging in economic activity that contributes 
to trans-boundary and possibly global negative environmental externalities.3 It will 
be strongest if these economic activities are connected to the goods and services 
exported by a country. 
Connected to the last point, if countries more open to trade have a more 
substantial interest in future trade agreements in order to expand trading 
opportunities, then their participation in multilateral cooperation, environmental 
                                                                                                                                     
2
 Thus called in tradition of the “democratic peace”, which suggests that democracies rarely fight 
against each other. 
3
 Note that the negative externality need not accrue in a physical form, but can be psychological as 
well. For example, cruel treatment to animals within the national boundaries of one country can 
have spill-over effects as individuals in other countries suffer from knowing about this cruel 
treatment. 
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or not, might serve as a signalling device. The signal sent out to other countries is 
that the country wants to be seen as serious about multilateral cooperation in 
general and therefore fit for multilateral cooperation concerning trade agreements 
in particular (Fredriksson and Gaston, 1999, 2000). Hoel and Schneider (1997, p. 
155) go as far as arguing that a country might become excluded from a future 
trade agreement if it refuses to participate in multilateral environmental 
cooperation efforts. While there is little evidence that a country might become 
excluded from a trade agreement merely because of its refusal to participate in 
multilateral environmental cooperation, countries are in a constant process of 
“give” and “take” in multilateral negotiations where willingness to cooperate in 
the environmental arena might be necessary to achieve the country’s objective in 
another policy field. A country that has not much to gain from multilateral 
environmental cooperation might still participate in order to reap the benefits of 
cooperation in other areas, particularly trade, where it has more to gain. 
Environmental concessions might therefore be the quid pro quo necessary to strike 
a deal in other areas of multilateral cooperation. 
As another reason grounded in self interest consider the fact that often 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) contain trade restrictive measures. 
In as much as countries more open to trade are bound to be more affected by these 
restrictive measures than more closed countries, they have an incentive to 
participate in these MEAs in order to have a voice in the negotiations and 
influence the result according to their interest. To abstain carries the risk of being 
confronted with a fait accompli that might very well damage the trading interest of 
the abstaining country. 
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Self-interest can potentially deter countries open to trade from participating in 
MEAs as well, however. Participation in MEAs usually implies incurring real 
economic costs to achieve the environmental objectives. Countries open to trade 
might be particularly concerned about losses to their economy’s “competitiveness” 
if they were to incur these costs (Stewart, 1993; Esty and Geradin, 1997). In 
particular, if a MEA is likely to contain trade restrictive measures that would 
considerably damage the economic prospects of a country, then specific export 
interests might deter rather than promote multilateral environmental cooperation. 
If a country perceives that in spite of participation it cannot exert enough influence 
to alter the trade and other restrictions contained in a MEA sufficiently towards its 
own interests, then this country might find it more attractive to stay outside the 
MEA. In particular, big and important countries might stand a chance to endanger 
the whole process of multilateral environmental cooperation if they perceive that 
the benefits are not worth the costs they incur and therefore boycott the MEA. 
Witness the United States opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, which puts the treaty 
itself in danger. 
As concerns more idealistic grounds, the major argument is that people living 
in countries open to trade are not only exposed to foreign goods and services, but 
also to new ideas and information about the environmental and other conditions 
outside their own countries. Trade openness might thus foster an appreciation of 
the problems generated by trans-boundary and global negative environmental 
externalities, which might put pressure on a country’s policy makers to participate 
in multilateral efforts to solve these problems. This incentive is likely to be 
stronger if a country actually imports significant amounts of goods and services 
and not just merely exports them. 
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Trade liberalisation and environmental protection are often, rightly or wrongly, 
claimed to be conflicting objectives. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to 
analyse and evaluate these claims (see Neumayer, 2001). What is important here is 
that since countries are bound to become increasingly open towards trade, 
environmentally grounded resistance to this trend is likely to become stronger. If, 
however, trade openness promoted multilateral environmental cooperation, then 
one important argument could be made in favour of a synergy, rather than conflict, 
between trade liberalisation and environmental protection.  
 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
a. Methodology 
There are basically two methods available for analysing systematically whether 
trade openness promotes multilateral environmental cooperation. One is to 
examine whether countries open to trade are more likely to sign or ratify MEAs 
than closed countries. The dependent variable is therefore a dichotomous one: the 
country either signs/ratifies or not. The appropriate estimation technique for this 
method is probit or logit. The second method is to examine whether countries 
open to trade are more likely to ratify MEAs or otherwise become a party to the 
MEA earlier than closed countries. The dependent variable is therefore a 
continuous time variable. One possible estimation technique for this method is the 
Cox proportional hazards model, also known as a survival model. It assumes that 
there is a time-variant underlying base hazard of ratification at any point of time 
that depends on unobserved variables. Observed control variables increase or 
lower this base hazard by a constant proportional amount. 
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Both methods have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The first 
method is conceptually clear: a country failing to sign or ratify a MEA clearly fails 
to cooperate. Also, probit and logit are widely used estimation techniques. Its 
major disadvantage is that it cannot deal with MEAs that have a quasi-universal 
membership since the lack of variation would inhibit statistical testing. It might 
actually be advantageous to be forced to look at MEAs open to all, but without 
virtually global membership, however. This is because it is exactly these MEAs 
where environmental commitment is needed on behalf of countries to join. Global 
membership MEAs, on the other hand, are often agreements that can be joined 
without commitment to incurring any costs. It is doubtful whether they represent 
much gain in relation to the non-cooperative outcome. 
The second method is conceptually less clear. Fredriksson and Gaston (1999, 
2000) argue that early ratification can function as a proxy for a country’s intensity 
of preference for multilateral environmental cooperation. They regard ratification 
delay as a clear sign for lack of commitment: 
 
Those countries that delay their ratification of treaty do so, either 
because they perceive the treaty provisions as too costly and severe, 
or lacking net benefits (or that it may be strategically worthwhile to 
“hold-out”, in which case they risk non-implementation of the 
agreement). (Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000, p. 347). 
 
In support of their argument they refer to Sand who argues that 
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...possibly the most serious drawback of the treaty method [for 
dealing with multilateral environmental problems, E.N.] is the time 
lag between the drafting, adoption and entry into force of standards. 
Sand (1991, p. 250). 
 
However, while early ratification might show commitment to the 
environmental cause of the MEA, a delay in ratification can be caused by many 
factors other than lack of commitment. For example, some countries might find it 
difficult to achieve early ratification due to the peculiarities of their political 
system. Also, in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, ratification by 
almost all countries with binding emission restrictions is delayed due to conflict 
about the specifics of some of the provisions contained in the Protocol. 
The second method’s great advantage is that it allows for greater variation 
among countries since the dependent variable is not simply a dichotomous one. 
Connected to this point, it can examine MEAs with quasi-universal membership 
since countries will still differ with respect to the time of their ratification. This 
method’s disadvantages are that the estimation technique used is far less familiar 
to readers. More importantly, this method cannot deal with very recent MEAs that 
have not been ratified by many countries yet since MEAs are usually signed at the 
same time by most prospective parties. For these cases only the first method is 
suitable. There is a disadvantage connected to analysing signature rather than 
ratification, however. This is because a country is not bound to a treaty unless it 
has ratified it. Signature is not a formal commitment. A good example for this is 
the de facto withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol, which is of 
course easily possible since the country has not yet ratified the treaty. 
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b. The dependent variables 
In this paper we will use both methods. We use the first method for three MEAs 
that do not have quasi-universal membership and are too recent to having been 
ratified by many countries: 
 
• the Kyoto Protocol (84 signatures as of 26 October 2001; www.unfccc.org). It 
is a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC). It sets up restrictions for so-called Annex 1 countries (OECD-
countries plus the economies in transition in Eastern Europe including the 
Russian Federation) on their emission of greenhouse gases. In its current form 
it does not contain any substantive trade restrictive measures, but it is expected 
to do so in the future (Neumayer, 2001). 
• the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam 
Convention) (73 signatures as of 1 September 2001; www.chem.unep.ch). It is 
a MEA in pursuance of chapter 19 of the Agenda 21 on ‘Environmentally 
sound management of toxic chemicals, including prevention of illegal 
international traffic in toxic and dangerous products’. Its objective is ‘to 
promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among Parties in the 
international trade of certain hazardous chemicals in order to protect human 
health and the environment from potential harm and to contribute to their 
environmentally sound use’ (Art. 1). Annex III of the Convention specifies the 
chemicals which are subject to the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure 
(initially, Annex III encompasses 30 chemicals). This means, that a country 
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may only export one of these chemicals to another country if it has sought and 
received the PIC of the importing country. Furthermore, the exporting country 
has the duty to provide for ‘labelling requirements that ensure adequate 
availability of information with regard to risks and/or hazards to human health 
or the environment, taking into account relevant international standards’ (Art. 
13:2). This applies to all chemicals listed in Annex III, all chemicals banned or 
severely restricted in the exporting country’s territory (Art. 13:2) as well as to 
all chemicals subject to environmental or health labelling requirements (Art. 
13:3). Exports of chemicals, the use of which is banned or severely restricted 
in the exporting country’s territory, are subject to laborious information 
requirements for export notification as laid down in Annex V of the 
Convention. 
• the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(103 signatures as of 12 September 2001; www.biodiv.org). This Biosafety 
Protocol controls the use of living modified organisms, better known as 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), which pose a threat to biodiversity as 
they represent an exogenously introduced disturbance of existing ecosystems 
and, in some cases at least, can mutate, migrate and procreate. It is a Protocol 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Art. 19:3 of the CBD calls 
upon parties to consider ‘the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out 
appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, 
in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified 
organism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity’. The Biosafety 
Protocol does just that. The single most important trade restrictive element of 
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the Protocol is an advance informed agreement procedure similar to the prior 
informed consent mechanism of the Rotterdam Convention. The country of 
potential import can put conditions on the import or even ban the import. 
However, many types of GMOs are not subject to this procedure. 
 
We use the second method for another three MEAs that have quasi-universal 
membership:4 
 
• the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) (155 parties as of 14 November 2001; www.cites.org). It 
restricts the trade in endangered species listed in its appendix I and II. 
Appendix I contains species (around 600 animals and 300 plant species), 
which are threatened with extinction and whose trade for commercial purposes 
is generally prohibited with few exceptions (Article III). Appendix II contains 
a further 4000 animals and 25,000 plants species, which might become 
threatened with extinction if their trade was not regulated. Their export is only 
allowed if the exporter has acquired an export permit from the state of export, 
testifying that the export will not be detrimental to the survival of that species, 
that the specimen were not obtained in contravention of protection laws of the 
exporting state and that any living specimen will be so prepared for transport 
that risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment is minimised (Art. IV). 
• the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (180 
parties as of 29 August 2001; www.unep.ch/ozone). The aim of the Montreal 
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Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is to phase out ozone 
depleting substances (ODS): substances responsible for the thinning of the 
ozone layer in the stratosphere, which filters out ultraviolet radiation. The 
Protocol’s major trade provisions are contained in its Art. 4. It bans imports 
(Art. 4.1) and exports (Art. 4.2) of controlled substances between parties and 
non-parties of the Protocol, unless non-parties can demonstrate that in spite of 
not being formally a party to the Protocol they nevertheless comply with its 
obligations (Art. 4.8). Art. 4.3 also bans the import of products containing 
controlled substances from non-parties. 
• the Convention on Biological Diversity (182 parties as of 12 September 2001; 
www.biodiv.org). The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was 
one of the few tangible results of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
the Environment (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, has as its objectives 
‘the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components 
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization 
of genetic resources’ (Art. 1). It does not explicitly provide for trade measures. 
 
Data on the status of signature and the date of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession are from the homepages of the respective MEAs.5 Together 
these six MEAs cover a broad range of environmental concern: from climate 
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 We do not look at ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC), which has been analysed by Fredriksson and Gaston (1999, 2000). 
5
 Note that none of the results reported further below changes substantially if all ratifications, 
acceptances, approvals and accessions before the agreed conditional date of entry into force are 
treated as equivalent. 
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change, ozone layer depletion, trade in hazardous chemicals and pesticides to 
genetically modified organisms, biodiversity and wildlife conservation. Because 
ratification is open to all countries at the same time, in principle left censoring is 
not a problem. However, some countries gained their independence only after the 
MEA was opened for ratification. In these cases, ratification delay was counted 
from the date of their independence, which was established with the help of CIA 
(2000). Belarus and the Ukraine are exceptions to this rule. They had a seat in the 
United Nations and the right to sign and ratify international agreements before 
their independence from the former Soviet Union. 
 
c. The independent variables 
There is no uniformly agreed measure of trade openness, our main independent 
variable of interest. We will use a range of proxy variables here. The first one is a 
simple dichotomous variable, which is set to 1 if a country is a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and 0 otherwise (information taken from 
www.wto.org). The idea is that WTO members have revealed a commitment to 
trade openness in participating in a multilateral regime whose objective is the 
liberalisation and expansion of trade. 
The next two proxies are commonly used rather simple measures: one is the 
natural log of the sum of exports and imports divided by gross domestic product 
(GDP). The other consists of the natural log of exports divided by GDP as well as, 
separately, the natural log of imports divided by GDP.6 Since the amount of goods 
and services traded can change quite a bit from year to year, the simple average of 
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the relevant data over the period 1994 to 1998 was taken (data from World Bank, 
2000). The other proxies are more complex. The fourth variable is an index of 
trade openness published by the Fraser Institute (2000), as part of their 1997 
Economic Freedom of the World index. It is a composite measure of taxes levied 
on international trade as percent of exports plus imports, the difference between 
the official exchange rate and the black market rate, the actual size of the trade 
sector compared to the expected size as well as restrictions on the freedom of 
citizens to engage in capital transactions with foreigners. It ranges from 0 (least 
trade open) to 10 (most trade open). The last proxy variable is an index of trade 
openness published by the Heritage Foundation (2001). Similar to the Fraser 
Institute index, it is part of their 2001 Index of Economic Freedom. It is a 
composite measure of a country’s average tariff rate, existing non-tariff barriers 
and perceived corruption in a country’s customs services. This index ranges from 
1 (most trade open) to 5 (least trade open). In order to facilitate understanding it 
has been reversed for the estimations reported further below, such that 1 means 
least and 5 means most trade open. 
In addition to these general trade openness variables, we also include a number 
of specific export interest variables for five out of the six MEAs looked at. For the 
Kyoto Protocol, a dummy is used for countries that export fossil fuels (data taken 
from World Bank, 2001). For the Biosafety Protocol, a dummy is used for 
countries with plantations of genetically modified crops in excess of 100,000 
hectares (data taken from James, 2000). For the Rotterdam Convention a logged 
variable measuring the share of the value of chemical to all exports is used. 
                                                                                                                                     
6
 We log some variables if their distribution is skewed in order to reduce potential problems with 
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Chemical exports are taken from UNCTAD (2000), general export data from 
World Bank (2000). For the Montreal Protocol, a variable measures the log of net 
exports (production minus consumption) of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in tons of 
ozone depleting potential averaged over the period 1986 to 1989, with data 
compiled from UNEP (1999). For the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species a variable is used that measures the ratio of threatened species 
to all species, with data compiled from WCMC (1994). No trade related specific 
variable could be found for the Convention on Biological Diversity, which 
contains only few directly trade relevant provisions. However, we included as a 
general interest variable the logged total number of species estimated to be located 
within a country, with data compiled from WCMC (1994). 
Apart from the variables for trade openness, three other general control 
variables are used throughout. In addition to theoretical justification they have also 
proven to be significant factors explaining environmental commitment in 
Neumayer (2002). The first is per capita income, which is expected to have a 
positive effect on a country’s willingness to participate in multilateral 
environmental cooperation efforts. In economic terms this would mean that this 
willingness is a luxury good with an income elasticity greater than one. Note that 
this need not imply that poor countries care less about trans-boundary and global 
environmental problems per se. Rather, because of their poverty they might 
prioritise issues other than these. Income per capita is measured as GDP per capita 
in purchasing power parity (PPP) in US$ in 1998, taken from UNDP (2000). 
Second, big and “important” countries should be more environmentally committed 
                                                                                                                                     
heteroscedasticity. 
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than small and “unimportant” ones. As a proxy for this variable one could either 
take a country’s total income or population since both economic power and 
population size should be positively correlated with “importance”. The natural log 
of total population size is used as a proxy for a country’s importance here (data 
taken from World Bank, 2000).7 Note that more important countries might show 
signs of stronger willingness to participate in multilateral environmental 
cooperation efforts not necessarily due to stronger environmental concern per se. 
Rather, we hypothesise here that these countries will find it in their interest to 
demonstrate stronger willingness to participate in these cooperation efforts in 
order to demonstrate their importance in world politics, of which environment 
represents one part. In other words, important countries want to be seen as good 
citizens and leaders in world environmental affairs. Another incentive for these 
countries to participate in multilateral cooperation might be that it allows them to 
internalise part of the benefits generated by cooperation. The third and final 
control variable is a measure for “democracy” taken from Freedom House (2000), 
based on 1998 data. Their measure is derived from expert assessments of the 
extent to which a country effectively provides for political rights and civil 
liberties, both measured on a 1 to 7 scale (Karatnycky, 1999, pp. 546-553). 
Political rights refer to, for example, the existence and fairness of elections, 
existence of opposition and the possibility to take over power via elections. Civil 
liberties refer to, for example, the freedom of assembly, the right to open and free 
discussion, the independence of media, protection from political terror and the 
prevalence of the rule of law. For the estimations used below the two indices have 
                                                 
7
 The reader should note that total income and population cannot be used simultaneously as this 
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been added and reversed in sign, such that 2 means lowest and 14 means highest 
measure of “democracy”. 
 
3. RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the probit estimation results for the Kyoto Protocol, the Biosafety 
Protocol and the Rotterdam Convention.8 Note that the reported coefficients are 
already changes in the probability for a one unit increase of a variable at the mean 
of all variables, not the non-transformed probit coefficients.9 There are five 
different estimations for each MEA depending on which of our proxy for trade 
openness enters the estimated equation in addition to the three control variables 
included throughout. A more detailed discussion and interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients for the trade variables is presented in the next section. 
Starting with the Kyoto Protocol, all our non-trade related control variables are 
statistically significant in all estimations: Richer, more democratic and more 
populous countries are more likely to have signed the Kyoto Protocol. As 
concerns our proxy variables for general trade openness, only the Fraser Institute 
index shows some statistical significance. Fuel exporters are less likely to have 
signed the Protocol and significantly so in four out of the five cases. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
                                                                                                                                     
would lead to perfect multicollinearity given that per capita income is another explanatory variable. 
8
 Alternatively, logit estimates could have been undertaken. The two techniques generally provide 
very similar results (Verbeek, 2000). 
9
 For a dummy variable, it represents the change in probability due to a change in the dummy from 
0 to 1. 
19 
 
Turning to the Biosafety Protocol it can be seen that almost without exception 
democracy and the population size of a country have a positive impact upon the 
predicted probability of having signed this Protocol. The income variable, on the 
other hand, is insignificant throughout. The explanation for this is that Biosafety is 
of substantial environmental concern to developing countries as well and there are 
very limited costs in their participation. WTO membership and the Fraser Institute 
index are the only statistically significant proxy variables for general trade 
openness, both with a positive sign. Countries with substantial production of 
genetically modified crops are statistically significantly less likely to have signed 
the Protocol in four out of the five models tested. Note, however, that this variable 
needs to be treated with care. There are only six countries with substantial 
production, namely, the United States, Argentina, Canada and – albeit on a much 
smaller scale – China, South Africa and Australia. Due to the little variation in 
this dummy variable, the estimated coefficient is highly sensitive to any single one 
of these country’s decision to sign or not. Argentina, Canada and China have 
signed the Protocol, Australia, South Africa and the United States have not. 
As concerns the Rotterdam Convention, neither income nor population size is 
consistently estimated as having a positive significant effect on signature. WTO 
membership again assumes statistical significance. As before, trade openness as 
measured by the sum of exports and imports per GDP is insignificant, but note 
that in the case of the Rotterdam Convention this is triggered by the opposing 
effects export and import openness have: countries with a high exports to GDP 
ratio are statistically significantly more likely, countries with a high imports to 
GDP ratio are less likely to have signed the Convention. A greater share of 
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chemical among all exports does not have a statistically significant influence 
throughout. 
Turning to the remaining three MEAs for which the second method was used, 
Table 2 reports estimated results from a Cox proportional hazards model for the 
Montreal Protocol, the Biodiversity Convention and CITES. Note that the reported 
coefficients are hazard ratios. A coefficient greater than one means that the 
corresponding variable has a positive impact upon the speed of ratification and a 
negative impact for a coefficient smaller than one. Starting with the Montreal 
Protocol, both income and population size speed up ratification. The clear 
significance of the income variable was to be expected as ozone layer depletion 
was strongly considered to be a “rich man’s concern” at the time. Note that the 
only proxy for general trade openness statistically significant are the sum of 
exports and imports per GDP as well as exports per GDP, separately. Also, higher 
exports of CFCs result in a more rapid ratification of the Montreal Protocol. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
In case of the CBD, all non-trade related control variables are significant 
throughout. Note that the income variable is smaller than one throughout and 
significantly so in all but one case. This is triggered by the fact that the CBD with 
its promise of a ‘fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources’ (Art. 1) soon became an MEA favoured by 
developing countries. As concerns the general trade openness variables, WTO 
membership, export openness and the Fraser Institute index are estimated to have 
a positive significant effect on ratification speed. Import openness has the opposite 
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effect. Greater biodiversity results in ratification delay. This can be explained with 
the fact that biodiversity-rich countries were for a long time sceptical about the 
CBD as they feared it would encroach into what they perceived as their sovereign 
right over the genetic resources within their territory. 
For CITES, democracy and population size have a positive impact upon 
ratification speed, whereas income has a significantly negative impact in two 
estimations. WTO membership, the Fraser Institute index as well as exports per 
GDP exert a statistically significantly positive impact upon ratification speed. 
Note that, again, imports per GDP are statistically significant with the opposite 
sign.10 A higher ratio of threatened to all species on a country’s territory speeds up 
ratification. 
 
4. DISCUSSION OF THE EFFECT OF TRADE OPENNESS 
The results reported above provide some evidence for trade openness promoting 
multilateral environmental cooperation. None of the proxies for trade openness 
consistently appears to be a statistically significant explanatory factor. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that WTO membership assumes statistical 
significance for four out of the six MEAs under investigation. Note that causality 
is not necessarily claimed here. But it suggests that being accustomed to cooperate 
in multilateral trade affairs goes, to some extent at least, hand in hand with 
countries’ willingness to cooperate in multilateral environmental affairs as well. 
This is a good message because a WTO dispute over some trade restrictive 
                                                 
10
 The latter result mirrors a finding by Fredriksson and Gaston (1999), where export openness 
proved to have a positive and import openness a negative effect on ratification speed for the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). 
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measure contained in a MEA is most likely to break out between two WTO 
members, where one is and the other is not a party to the MEA (Neumayer 2000). 
Hence, if WTO membership tends to promote a country’s willingness to cooperate 
in multilateral environmental affairs, there is less danger of such a dispute. 
How strong is the effect? After controlling for other variables, WTO members 
are estimated to have a 30 per cent higher likelihood to have signed the Biosafety 
Protocol and a 26 per cent higher likelihood to have signed the Rotterdam 
Convention than non-members, which is certainly not negligible. Interpretation of 
the relevant coefficient in the case of the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
the CITES is not quite as straightforward. Note that the coefficients signify the 
hazard ratio of becoming a party to the MEA at any point of time associated with a 
one-unit change in the variable or a change from 0 to 1 for a dummy variable, 
conditional on all other variables remaining constant and given a certain 
underlying time-dependent baseline hazard that represents exogenous unobserved 
variables. The effect of WTO membership is estimated to increase this hazard by 
about 64 per cent for the Convention on Biological Diversity and by about 95 per 
cent for the CITES. 
General export openness also assumes statistical significance in four out of the 
six cases. It is striking that export openness assumes statistical significance in all 
three MEAs that contain quite elaborate trade restrictive measures (Rotterdam 
Convention, Montreal Protocol and CITES). One could interpret this as evidence 
in favour of the theoretical proposition that countries with a large export sector 
want to be seen as taking on responsibility in multilateral environmental affairs 
and want to have a voice and vote in negotiations of MEAs that contain trade 
restrictive measures that potentially affect their trading interests. 
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General import openness, contrary to general export openness, is irrelevant in 
most cases and has a negative impact on multilateral environmental cooperation in 
two cases. One plausible explanation for this is that these countries do not have as 
much interest in multilateral environmental cooperation because they are less 
vulnerable to critique if they fail to cooperate and are less vulnerable to any 
potential trade restrictive measures as well, which usually tend to affect exports 
stronger than imports. As an example, consider the Montreal Protocol, which went 
as far as threatening to ban or restrict imports from non-parties of goods made 
with, but not containing, controlled substances (Article 4.4), which poses a 
significant and clear threat to exporting countries. The finding also invalidates the 
theoretical suggestion that import openness promotes multilateral environmental 
cooperation via an influx of ideas and an appreciation of environmental problems 
beyond the nation’s borders. 
How strong is the effect of general export and import openness? A one point 
increase at the mean of the logged export to GDP ratio variable, ln(EXP), leads to 
31 per cent greater likelihood of having signed the Rotterdam Convention. The 
same increase in the logged imports to GDP ratio, ln(IMP), leads to 44 per cent 
less likelihood of having signed the Convention, which is certainly not negligible 
even if one considers that the standard deviations are 0.66 for ln(EXP) and 0.57 
for ln(IMP), respectively. A one-unit increase in ln(EXP) raises the hazard by 40 
per cent in the case of the Montreal Protocol, by 61 per cent in the case of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and by 113 per cent in the case of CITES. 
As concerns the composite measures of trade openness, the Heritage 
Foundation index tests insignificant throughout. The Fraser Institute index 
assumes statistical significance in the case of four MEAs. However, one cannot be 
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sure whether the significance is not spurious. This is because of the high 
collinearity of this measure of trade openness with the income and democracy 
control variables (partial Pearson correlation coefficients greater than 0.6). High 
correlation with the control variables is much less a problem for the other proxies 
of general trade openness, which suggests that one can be more confident that they 
do not merely artificially assume some explanatory power that rightly belongs to 
one of the other control variables. 
Contrary to general export openness, specific export interests do not play a 
consistent role. Fossil fuel exporters are less likely to have signed the Kyoto 
Protocol. The same is true for countries growing crops that are genetically 
modified in the case of the Biosafety Protocol. For the Rotterdam Convention a 
higher ratio of chemicals exports to all exports does not have a statistically 
significant effect on countries’ willingness to cooperate. On the other hand, for the 
Montreal Protocol countries with greater exports of CFCs are estimated to have 
ratified the Protocol earlier on. The same is true for countries with a higher ratio 
of threatened to total species for CITES. The explanation for these differences 
probably lies in the nature of the MEAs. Fossil fuel exporters have much to lose 
from a MEA such as the Kyoto Protocol that tries to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions, which mainly stem from fossil fuel consumption. Countries growing 
crops that are genetically modified might resist a treaty that regulates and in many 
instances restricts trade in these crops.11 For the Rotterdam Convention, it is 
unclear whether chemical exporters have more to gain from participating and 
influencing the treaty process or abstaining, which is reflected in the 
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insignificance of the chemical exports variable. For CITES, countries with a high 
ratio of threatened species to total species were presumably better off cooperating 
and influencing the decision making process than facing potential trade boycotts 
by Western countries outside their control. As concerns the Montreal Protocol, 
Murdoch and Sandler (1994) argue that the major producers (and therefore 
exporters) had enough incentives to reduce their emissions out of their own self-
interest. The Montreal Protocol might merely have codified the non-cooperative 
Nash strategies of the major players who would have undertaken the emission 
reductions in any case. Given that the same industries that produced CFCs before 
were also the prime candidates for producing substitutes, the major exporters had 
a strong incentive to bring the Montreal Protocol into force early on. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
All in all, similar to Fredriksson and Gaston (1999, 2000), but based on a much 
wider sample of MEAs and a broader set of proxies for trade openness, this article 
finds some evidence that general trade openness promotes multilateral 
environmental cooperation. As countries are likely to become more and more open 
to trade this could have a positive effect on multilateral environmental 
cooperation. However, one cannot rely on increased trade openness having a 
strong positive effect on multilateral environmental cooperation efforts. Looking 
across the MEAs it is striking that general export openness plays most of a role in 
exactly those treaties that contain elaborate trade restrictive measures, namely the 
Rotterdam Convention, the Montreal Protocol and CITES. General export 
                                                                                                                                     
11
 As explained in the last section, this variable needs to be treated with caution, however, due to its 
26 
openness might therefore only promote multilateral environmental cooperation in 
those cases were significant trade-relevant provisions are at stake. Whether 
specific trade interests promote or hinder countries’ willingness to cooperate in 
MEAs depends on whether the MEA under consideration is likely to threaten or 
accommodate the interests of exporters. Fossil fuel exporters have much to lose 
from the Kyoto Protocol, hence they are less likely to have signed it. The same is 
possibly true for countries producing crops that are genetically modified in the 
case of the Biosafety Protocol. For the Montreal Protocol and CITES, however, 
specific export interests might have helped to bring about multilateral 
environmental cooperation. 
For successful MEAs to be negotiated, signed and speedily ratified political 
commitment by the community of nation states is necessary. Trade openness 
might help as this article has tried to demonstrate. Clearly, however, more 
research is warranted on this important issue. Questions worth investigating 
include whether this paper’s results remain valid for other MEAs and for other 
indicators or proxy variables for multilateral environmental cooperation, however 
difficult finding these might be. 
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Table 1: Signature of MEAs (Probit estimations). 
 
 Kyoto Protocol Biosafety Protocol Rotterdam Convention 
 I II III IV V I II III IV V I II III IV V 
ln(GDP) 0.21*** 
(4.16) 
0.21*** 
(3.80) 
0.19*** 
(3.27) 
0.15** 
(2.24) 
0.16*** 
(2.68) 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.36) 
-0.06 
(1.18) 
-0.04 
(0.69) 
0.10** 
(2.10) 
0.12** 
(2.17) 
0.06 
(0.93) 
0.07 
(1.03) 
0.06 
(1.04) 
DEMOCRACY 0.04** 
(2.45) 
0.06*** 
(3.47) 
0.04** 
(2.39) 
0.06*** 
(2.70) 
0.03* 
(1.78) 
0.04*** 
(3.11) 
0.04*** 
(3.25) 
0.04*** 
(3.44) 
0.01 
(0.70) 
0.04*** 
(3.35) 
-0.00 
(.28) 
0.01 
(0.56) 
0.01 
(0.70) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
ln(POP) 0.06** 
(2.33) 
0.09*** 
(2.76) 
0.09** 
(2.56) 
0.09** 
(2.22) 
0.05* 
(1.87) 
0.08*** 
(3.30) 
0.07** 
(2.24) 
0.06** 
(1.96) 
0.06** 
(2.13) 
0.09*** 
(3.06) 
0.07** 
(2.49) 
0.06 
(1.55) 
0.03 
(0.90) 
0.05 
(1.03) 
0.05 
(1.16) 
WTO-dummy -0.09 
(.80) 
    0.30*** 
(2.68) 
    0.26** 
(2.37) 
    
ln(TRADE)  0.14 
(1.24) 
    -0.13 
(1.35) 
    -0.08 
(0.89) 
   
ln(EXP)   0.15 
(0.97) 
    0.08 
(0.60) 
    0.31** 
(2.05) 
  
ln(IMP)   0.02 
(0.10) 
    -0.23 
(1.45) 
    -0.44** 
(2.42) 
  
FRASER    0.06* 
(1.92) 
    0.06** 
(2.20) 
    0.03 
(1.02) 
 
HERITAGE     0.07 
(1.47) 
    0.02 
(0.51) 
    0.05 
(1.19) 
FUEL-EXP-dummy -0.40** 
(2.20) 
-0.46** 
(2.48) 
-0.47** 
(2.50) 
-0.41* 
(1.83) 
-0.28 
(1.25) 
          
GMO-dummy      -0.39* 
(1.76) 
-0.41* 
(1.74) 
-0.40* 
(1.71) 
-0.45** 
(1.96) 
-0.39 
(1.61) 
     
ln(CHEM-EXP)           -0.01 
(0.17) 
-.01 
(0.15) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.39) 
Observations 175 160 159 121 143 175 160 159 121 143 175 160 159 121 143 
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.37 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.08 
 
Note: Dependent variable is signature (1 = country signed; 0 = country did not sign). Reported coefficients are changes in probability for a one unit change in the 
variable at the mean of all variables (for a change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables). Robust standard errors. Absolute z-values in parentheses. 
* statistically significant at 90% level  ** at 95% level  *** at 99% level 
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Table 2. Ratification speed of MEAs (Cox proportional hazard model). 
 
 Montreal Protocol Convention on Biological Diversity Convent. on Int. Trade in Endangered 
Species 
 I II III IV V I II III IV V I II III IV V 
ln(GDP) 1.41*** 
(3.08) 
144*** 
(3.12) 
1.38** 
(2.53) 
1.42*** 
(2.70) 
1.39*** 
(2.62) 
0.80** 
(3.28) 
0.81** 
(2.40) 
0.72*** 
(3.35) 
0.70*** 
(3.22) 
0.78** 
(2.49) 
0.93 
(.92) 
0.89 
(1.53) 
0.77*** 
(2.71) 
0.75*** 
(2.86) 
0.92 
(0.96) 
DEMOCRACY 1.03 
(.98) 
1.02 
(1.00) 
1.02 
(1.03) 
1.01 
(0.19) 
1.01 
(0.37) 
1.10*** 
(3.88) 
1.12*** 
(3.81) 
1.13*** 
(4.48) 
1.10*** 
(2.91) 
1.19*** 
(3.26) 
1.10*** 
(3.54) 
1.13*** 
(4.37) 
1.14*** 
(4.48) 
1.09** 
(2.54) 
1.14*** 
(4.30) 
ln(POP) 1.18*** 
(4.04) 
1.24*** 
(4.39) 
1.20*** 
(3.85) 
1.20*** 
(3.51) 
1.17*** 
(3.79) 
1.18*** 
(2.81) 
1.19** 
(2.34) 
1.06** 
(2.06) 
1.18* 
(1.95 
1.18** 
(2.46) 
1.28*** 
(6.73) 
1.32*** 
(5.39) 
1.23*** 
(4.49) 
1.23*** 
(4.00) 
1.25*** 
(4.67) 
WTO-dummy 1.16 
(0.77) 
    1.64** 
(1.96) 
    1.95** 
(2.33) 
    
ln(TRADE)  1.29* 
(1.81) 
    0.99 
(0.05)) 
    1.24 
(1.21) 
   
ln(EXP)   1.40* 
(1.94) 
    1.61* 
(1.95) 
    2.13** 
(2.50) 
  
ln(IMP)   .83 
(0.87) 
    0.56* 
(1.91) 
    0.46** 
(2.41) 
  
FRASER    1.03 
(0.75) 
    1.13** 
(2.24) 
    1.16*** 
(2.94) 
 
HERITAGE     1.08 
(0.98) 
    1.05 
(0.51) 
    0.95 
(0.54) 
ln(CFC-EXP) 1.02*** 
(4.19) 
1.02*** 
(3.93) 
1.02*** 
(3.74) 
1.02*** 
(5.01) 
1.02*** 
(3.15) 
          
ln(BIODIVERSITY)      0.70*** 
(4.47) 
0.68*** 
(4.44) 
0.65*** 
(4.96) 
0.74** 
(2.01) 
0.77*** 
(3.42) 
     
THREATENED 
SPECIES 
          1.55*** 
(3.40) 
1.42** 
(2.19) 
1.41** 
(2.12) 
1.52*** 
(2.62) 
1.44** 
(2.00) 
Observations 172 157 156 120 140 175 160 159 121 143 174 160 159 121 142 
Log likelihood -679 -604 -599 -432 -530 -708 -639 -632 -451 -557 -632 -589 -580 -436 -499 
Pr(Wald) > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0035 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Note: Dependent variable is survival time (time until failure event occurs). Failure event is accession, acceptance, approval or ratification of MEA. Reported 
coefficients are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors. Absolute z-values in parentheses. 
* statistically significant at 90% level  ** at 95% level  *** at 99% level 
